Visual Phenomenology

Description

Phenomenological and empirical methods of investigating visual experience converge to support the thesis that visual perception is an ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment.

In this book, Michael Madary examines visual experience, drawing on both phenomenological and empirical methods of investigation. He finds that these two approaches—careful, philosophical description of experience and the science of vision—independently converge on the same result: Visual perception is an ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment.

Madary first makes the case for the descriptive premise, arguing that the phenomenology of vision is best described as on ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment. He discusses visual experience as being perspectival, temporal, and indeterminate; considers the possibility of surprise when appearances do not change as we expect; and considers the content of visual anticipation. Madary then makes the case for the empirical premise, showing that there are strong empirical reasons to model vision using the general form of anticipation and fulfillment. He presents a range of evidence from perceptual psychology and neuroscience, and reinterprets evidence for the two-visual-systems hypothesis. Finally, he considers the relationship between visual perception and social cognition. An appendix discusses Husserlian phenomenology as it relates to the argument of the book.

Madary argues that the fact that there is a convergence of historically distinct methodologies itself is an argument that supports his findings. With Visual Phenomenology, he creates an exchange between the humanities and the sciences that takes both methods of investigation seriously.Preface xi
Acknowledgments xiii
Abbreviations xv
Part I 1
1 Introduction 3
1.1 The Main Argument 3
1.2 The Sandwich or the Cycle? 5
1.3 Same Strategy, Different Results 12
2 Three Constraints 27
2.1 Visual Experience Is Perspectival 28
2.2 Visual Experience Is Temporal 32
2.3 Visual Experience Is Indeterminate 36
2.4 Thesis AF and the Three Constraints 38
3 Anticipation and Fulfillment 41
3.1 (PC) and Siegel’s Doll 41
3.2 (PC ′) and Five Points about Anticipation 43
3.3 Variation in Perceptual Content 54
3.4 Visual Anticipation and Two Distinctions 56
3.5 Summary 57
4 The Question of Content 59
4.1 Introducing AF Content 59
4.2 Alternative Theories of Content and Their Shortcomings 65
4.3 On the Denial of Perceptual Content 70
4.4 Four Problems and Three Solutions 75
4.5 Summary 86
Part II 89
5 Some Perceptual Psychology 91
5.1 Various Strands of Support 92
5.2 Rejecting the Myth of Full Detail 96
5.3 The Importance of Action 99
5.4 Facing the Resistance 103
5.5 Visual Attention 111
5.6 Objections and Replies 117
5.7 Summary 118
6 The Active Brain 119
6.1 Ongoing Cortical Dynamics 119
6.2 Neural Feedback 123
6.3 Theoretical Options 125
6.4 Summary 128
7 The Dorsal Stream and the Visual Horizon 131
7.1 Visual Consciousness and the Two Streams 131
7.2 Introducing the Visual Horizon 134
7.3 Input to the Dorsal Stream 136
7.4 Localized Damage and Illusions 138
7.5 Disturbances of Visual Motion 145
7.6 Computational Models of Dorsal Anticipation 149
Part III 153
8 The Convergence 155
8.1 Back to the Main Argument 155
8.2 The Best of Both Worlds—Symbolic Dynamics 160
8.3 Do We Need Internal Representations? 162
9 Seeing Our World 165
9.1 AF Content Is of a Shared Social World 165
9.2 Empirical Support 170
9.3 Embedded Rationality 174
Appendix: Husserl’s Phenomenology 177
A.1 Finding AF in Husserl 177
A.2 Descriptive Psychology or Transcendental Phenomenology? 180
A.3 Phenomenology and the Sciences of the Mind 184
Notes 191
References 203
Index 241Michael Madary is Assistant Researcher and Lecturer at the Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz.US